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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996 Supp.). Following 
transfer from the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1996 Supp.). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. ISSUES FOR REVIEW. 
1. Did the District Court correctly find that Appellant Roger 
T. Russell ("Russell") was neither a "judgment debtor" or a "successor 
in interest to the judgment debtor" within the meaning of Rule 69, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore lacked the capacity to 
redeem parcels of real property which Appellee Mark L. Rindlesbach 
("Rindlesbach") had purchased at a sheriff's sale? 
2. Did Evan W. Hansen ("Evan") bind Drew William Hansen 
("Drew") and Diana M. Hansen ("Diana") when he allegedly entered into 
an oral agreement with Russell for the sale and purchase of real 
property titled in their name, without any written document evidencing 
either Evan's authority to act of their behalf, or their subsequent 
ratification of Evan's acts. 
3. Did the District Court correctly find that notwithstanding 
Russell's acts allegedly performed in reliance on an oral agreement 
between himself and Evan for the purchase of real property owned by 
Drew and Diana, the statute of frauds prevented the specific 
performance of said oral agreement. 
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B. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
This matter is on appeal from the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Rindlesbach and against Russell. In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court views the 
facts in light most favorable to the non-moving party. Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 192 
(Utah 1991). In deciding whether a district court properly granted 
judgment as a matter of law to the prevailing party, the appellate 
court reviews the correctness of the trial court's conclusions of law. 
Wineaar v. Froerer Corp. , 813 P.2d 104, 197 (Utah 1991). However, an 
appellate court may affirm the grant of summary judgment on any ground 
available to the trial court, even if it is not one relief upon below. 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 135 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 25, CHAPTER 5, STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or 
power over or concerning real property or in any manner 
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation 
of law, or by deem or conveyance in writing subscribed by 
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed 
to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific 
performance of agreements in case of part performance 
thereof. 
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TITLE 78, CHAPTER 37, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
78-37-6. Right of redemption - Sales by parcels - Of land and 
water stock. 
Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of 
mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in case of 
sales under executions generally. In all cases where the 
judgment directs the sale of land, together with shares of 
corporate stock evidencing title to a water right used or 
intended to be used, or suitable for use, on the land, the 
court shall equitably apportion such water stock to the 
land, or some part thereof, in one or more parcels, as it 
may deem suitable for the sale thereof, and the land and 
water stock in each parcel shall be sold together, and for 
the purpose of such sale shall be regarded as real estate 
and subject to redemption as above specified. In all sales 
of real estate under foreclosure the court may determine 
the parcels and the order in which such parcels of property 
shall be sold. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 56(c). Summary Judgment. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall 
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
RULE 69(j)(3). Conduct of Sale. 
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under 
execution must be made at auction to the highest bidder, 
Monday through Saturday, legal holidays excluded, between 
the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. and 8 o'clock p.m. After 
sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution 
no more shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the 
execution nor such officer's deputy shall become a 
purchaser, or be interested in any purchase at such sale. 
When the sale is of personal property capable of manual 
delivery it must be within view of those who attend the 
sale. The sale must be held in a place reasonably 
accessible to the general public. The property must be 
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sold in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest 
price; and when the sale is of real property, consisting of 
several known lots or parcels, they must be sold 
separately; or when a portion of such real property is 
claimed by a third person, and the third person requires it 
to be sold separately, such portion must be thus sold. All 
sales of real property must be made at the courthouse of 
the county in which the property, or some part thereof, is 
situated. The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may 
also direct the order in which the property, real or 
personal, shall be sold, when such property consists of 
several known lots or parcels, or of articles which can be 
sold to advantage separately, and the officer must follow 
such directions. The officer shall pay to the judgment 
creditor or the attorney for the judgment creditor so much 
of the sales proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. any 
excess in the proceeds over the judgment and reasonable 
accrued costs must be returned to the judgment debtor, 
unless otherwise directed by the judgment or the court. 
RULE 69(j)(l). Redemption of real property from sale. 
(1) Who may redeem. Real property sold subject to 
redemption, or any part sold separately, may be redeemed by 
the following persons or their successors in interest: (A) 
the judgment debtor; (B) a creditor having a lien by 
judgment, mortgage, or other lien on the property sold, or 
on some share or part thereof, subsequent to that on which 
the property was sold. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 18, 1993, Rindlesbach, who had acquired the 
beneficiary's interest in a trust deed encumbering certain real 
property owned by Drew and Diana, filed a Complaint seeking judicial 
foreclosure of the trust deed. On January 6, 1994, Russell, who 
claimed an interest in the real property pursuant to an oral purchase 
agreement, filed an Answer to Rindlesbach's Complaint, together with 
a Counterclaim, Crossclaim and Third-Party Complaint. On February 17, 
1994, Rindlesbach filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the 
relief sought in his Complaint and dismissal of Russell's 
Counterclaim. On June 23, 1994, the District Court entered its Order 
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Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of 
Rindlesbach and also entered a Decree of Foreclosure. Following 
issuance of an Order of Sale, Rindlesbach purchased the foreclosed 
property at a sheriff's sale conducted on August 2, 1994. 
On February 2, 1995, Russell filed a Petition for Determination 
of Entitlement to Redeem a portion of the foreclosed property and paid 
to the Court the redemption price of the foreclosed property. 
Rindlesbach objected to Russell's attempted redemption on the grounds 
that Russell had no standing to redeem. Twenty days later, on 
February 22, 1995, Rindlesbach commenced a second action, seeking to 
quiet title to the foreclosed property and other real property upon 
which Russell also asserted a claim. On March 21, 1995, the 
foreclosure action and the quiet title action were consolidated under 
the consolidated civil number 930906701. On May 9, 1995, Rindlesbach 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment against all 
defendants other than Russell, which was granted by an Order dated 
December 22, 1995. On August 11, 1995, Rindlesbach filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Russell, which motion was granted by a 
separate Order dated December 22, 1995. Also on December 22, 1995, 
the District Court entered its Judgment and Decree Quieting Title in 
the real property. On January 18, 1996, Russell filed his Notice of 
Appeal of the Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
Defendant Russell and of the Judgment and Decree Quieting Title. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Prior to December 1987, Evan and his spouse, Geneva, held 
fee title to certain real property located at approximately 1815 East 
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Creek Road South, Salt Lake City, Utah, consisting of approximately 
3.53 acres designated in six separate parcels (the "Creek Road 
Property11). (Rec. pp. 487, 488). 
2. On November 30, 1987 and December 7, 1987, Evan and Geneva 
conveyed the Creek Road Property to Drew and Diana by Quit Claim Deed. 
(Rec. pp. 487, 491, 492, 495). 
3. On or August 10, 1993, Rindlesbach, as buyer, and Drew and 
Diana and Evan, collectively as sellers, entered into an Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement whereby Rindlesbach intended to purchase five of the 
six parcels constituting the Creek Road Property. This real property, 
consisting of parcels 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 is hereinafter referred to as 
the "Contract Property". (Rec. pp. 415-417, 434-435). 
4. The closing of the sale under the Earnest Money Agreement 
was made conditional upon the sellers thereunder clearing title to the 
Contract Property. (Rec. pp. 418, 435). 
5. On or about October 26, 1993, Rindlesbach purchased, for 
good and valuable consideration, a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note from 
Capital City Bank, which Trust Deed encumbered Parcels 1, 3, 5 and 6 
of the Creek Road Property, hereinafter referred to as the "Trust Deed 
Property." (Rec. pp. 129-132, 136-155). 
6. On or about November 18, 1993, Rindlesbach initiated a 
judicial foreclosure action on the Trust Deed Property by filing a 
Complaint in Civil No. 930906701 before the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Mark Rindlesbach v. Drew William Hansen, 
et al. (the "Foreclosure Action"). (Rec. pp. 1-36). 
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7. On June 23, 1994, Judge Michael Murphy entered an Order 
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and a Decree of 
Foreclosure in the Foreclosure Action authorizing a Sheriff's Sale of 
the Trust Deed Property. (Rec. pp. 246-249, 250-257). 
8. In his Order, Judge Murphy specifically declared that 
Russell was not a "Judgment Debtor" as that term is used in Rule 69, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for the purpose of designating the 
order in which the parcels were to be sold. (Rec. p. 248). 
9. On August 2, 1994, pursuant to an Order of Sale, the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff sold the Trust Deed Property to Rindlesbach, the 
highest bidder, for the total sum of $98,036.11 ($10,036.11 for Parcel 
1; $58,000.00 for Parcels 3 and 5; and $30,000.00 for Parcel 6). 
(Rec. pp. 303-306). 
10. On or about November 17, 1994, for good and valuable 
consideration, Drew and Diana executed two separate Quit Claim Deeds 
(the "Quit Claim Deeds") whereby Rindlesbach acquired fee title to the 
Contract Property from Drew and Diana. (Rec. pp. 496, 502-504, 505). 
11. On or about December 2, 1994, for good and valuable 
consideration, Drew and Diana executed that certain Assignment of 
Redemption Rights assigning to Rindlesbach all of their rights to 
redeem the Trust Deed Property from the Sheriff's Sale. (Rec. pp. 
704-705). 
12. Russell claims an interest in the Creek Road Property as 
evidenced by that certain Notice of Interest dated on or about August 
16, 1993, and recorded in the official records of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on or about August 16, 1993, as Entry No. 5579822, in 
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Book 6731, at Pages 2762, et seq., supplemented by that certain 
Correction Notice of Interest dated on or about August 17, 1993, and 
recorded in the official records of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on or about August 17, 1993, as Entry No. 5581629, in Book 6733, at 
Pages 1352, et seq. (the "Notice of Interest"). (Rec. pp. 368, 539). 
13. The Notice of Interest relates to an alleged oral real 
estate contract entered into between Evan, as seller, and Russell, as 
buyer, in the spring of 1991 whereby Russell agreed to purchase and 
Evan allegedly agreed to sell a portion of the Contract Property (the 
"Oral Contract"). (Rec. p. 368). 
14. Drew and Diana, the fee owners of the Creek Road Property, 
never authorized Evan, either orally or in writing, to negotiate for 
or consummate a sale of the Creek Road Property either to Russell or 
to any other party. (Rec. pp. 488, 496). 
15. Although a proposed written agreement was drafted, it was 
never accepted or signed by the parties. In fact, Russell refused to 
execute the proposed agreement or take title to the property. (Rec. 
pp. 368, 488, 496, 513, 541-544). 
16. Prior to and after the spring of 1991 Russell made periodic 
payments either to Evan or for the benefit of the Creek Road Property, 
but did not make the payments or fulfill other covenants required in 
the proposed agreement. (Rec. pp. 535, 563-570). 
17. Prior to and after 1991, Russell kept some of his horses on 
the Creek Road Property which were cared for in part by Evan, whose 
residence remained on the Property. (Rec. pp. 474-478, 536). 
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18. Prior to and after 1991, Evan and Russell had various 
business dealings with each other, including loan and sales 
transactions. (Rec. pp. 460-462). 
19. Russell claims an interest in Parcels 3, 5 and 6 of the 
Trust Deed Property by virtue of his Petition for Determination of 
Entitlement to Redeem dated February 2, 1995, and the tender of 
certain funds into Court in the Foreclosure Action for the purpose of 
redeeming those parcels from the Sheriff's Sale. (Rec. p. 369). 
20. Rindlesbach has objected to and continues to oppose 
Russell/s Petition and attempted redemption and, on February 22, 1995, 
filed a Complaint herein seeking to quiet title to the Contract 
Property based both on the foreclosure action and his deeds from Drew 
and Diana. (Rec. pp. 328-334). 
21. The claims of each of the Defendants in the quiet title 
action other than Russell were resolved by the District Court's Order 
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Default Judgment 
Against Various Defendants. (Rec. pp. 602-606). 
22. On October 4, 1995, Judge Murphy granted Rindlesbach's 
Motion for Summary Judgment against Russell in the quiet title action, 
which was finalized in an Order and Judgment and Decree Quieting Title 
issued by Judge William A. Thane dated December 22, 1995. (Rec. pp. 
582-587, 588-595). 
23. On January 18, 1996, Russell filed a Notice of Appeal 
initiating this proceeding. (Rec. pp. 654-657). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Following the Sheriff's Sale on the Trust Deed Property, Russell 
attempted an eleventh hour redemption of the foreclosed property. 
Notwithstanding the prior determination of the District Court that 
Russell did not qualify as a judgment debtor, he now seeks to obtain 
redemption rights as a successor in interest to the judgment debtor. 
This argument is flawed. Russell has failed to demonstrate his right 
under Rule 69 (j) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The actual 
successor in interest to the Trust Deed Property of Drew and Diana is 
Rindlesbach. He purchased not only the fee title interest thereto but 
all rights of redemption as evidenced by recorded assignment 
instruments. 
The Creek Road Property has been titled in the joint names of 
Drew and Diana since November 30, 1987. Nevertheless, Russell 
negotiated exclusively with Evan for the purchase of the real 
property. His assertions that Evan was an agent with apparent 
authority to act on behalf of Drew and Diana fails because of the 
express language of the statute of frauds. Similarly, Russell's 
argument that the action and non-action of Drew and Diana constituted 
ratification of Evan's alleged oral contract with Russell similarly 
fails because of the Utah courts' extension of the statute of frauds. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1995 Repl.). 
Finally, Russell's attempt to bypass the responsibilities of the 
statute of frauds by asserting his partial performance of the oral 
contract does not meet the exclusive reference test generally 
recognized in Utah. Russell's claimed part performance of making 
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periodic payments (in the aggregate substantially less than that 
required under the alleged oral agreement)f his placement of his 
horses on the property, and assistance in the maintenance of the horse 
care area do not indicate performance under the oral contract as the 
only reasonable explanation for those actions. A long history of 
lending, commercial transactions, and animal husbandry between Russell 
and Evan provide much more likely explanations for their respective 
conduct. This is particularly evident in light of Russell's 
acknowledged refusal to ever execute and consummate the oral agreement 
or take title to the property. 
Russell's failure to show, as a matter of law, his legal 
entitlement to redeem the Trust Deed Property from the foreclosure 
sale, and to impose upon the non-contracting fee title owners of the 
Creek Road Property, an alleged incomplete oral agreement made with 
a non-owner thereof, were good and sufficient grounds for the District 
Court to grant Rindlesbach's Motion for Summary Judgment. That Order 
and the Decree Quieting Title should be affirmed by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RUSSELL LACKS THE STATUTORY CAPACITY REQUIRED BY RULE 69 IN ORDER 
TO REDEEM PROPERTY FROM THE SHERIFF'S SALE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-6 (1992 Repl.) provides that "[s]ales of 
real estate under judgments of foreclosure or mortgages and liens are 
subject to redemption as in case of sales under executions generally." 
The rules governing executions, including Sheriff's Sales, allow only 
certain "persons or their successors in interest" to redeem real 
property: "(A) the judgment debtor; [and] (B) a creditor having a 
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lien by judgment, mortgage, or other lien on the property sold . . . 
subsequent to that on which the property was sold." Utah R. Civ. P. 
69(j)(l). These provisions comprise Utah's entire statutory scheme 
for the redemption of real property. Russell's current attempt to 
qualify is now focused exclusively on the classification of a 
"successor in interest to judgment debtor". (See Appellant's Brief 
at p. 13) . 
It is widely recognized "that the right of redemption 
. . . [is] a substantive right to be exercised in strict accord with 
statutory terms." Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d 
1122, 1124 (Utah 1977) (overturning lower court's grant of an extension 
of time to redeem as an abuse of discretion) . Such terms include the 
determination of "classes that come within [the statute's] 
provisions." 50 C.J.S. Judicial Sales § 37(b) (1947). 
The District Court's Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the foreclosure action entered on June 23, 1994 
in the Foreclosure Action, included the following finding: 
3. Defendant Russell is not a "Judgment Debtor" as that 
term is used in Rule 69(e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and is therefore not entitled to make a 
designation of the order in which parcels of real property 
are to be sold at the anticipated Sheriff's Sale. 
(Rec. p. 248) . This Finding was a result of a hotly contested 
argument at the hearing and was based on the undisputed evidence that 
there was no written executed agreement whereby Russell claimed his 
alleged ownership to the property, neither was there any written 
document establishing Russell's financial responsibility to 
Rindlesbach for payment of Trust Deed Note subject of the foreclosure 
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action. Russell did not appeal that Order; rather, his counsel 
specifically consented to the form and content of the same. (Rec. p. 
249, 733). 
Although the term "judgment debtor" is not specifically defined 
in Rule 69 or any of its subsections, it is axiomatic that, unless 
otherwise defined, identical terms within subsections of the same rule 
must have identical meanings. Kilner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 847 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Kan. 1993). 
In Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P2d 42, 45 
(Utah App. 1988), the Court declared: 
Although any judge is free to change his or her mind on the 
outcome of a case until a final decision is formally rendered, 
. . . the "law of the case" doctrine is employed to avoid delay 
and to prevent injustice. The purpose of this doctrine is that 
in the interest of economy of time and efficiency of procedure, 
it is desirable to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in 
repetitious contentions and rulings upon the same propositions 
in the same case. 
In this matter, the 1994 Order finding that Russell was not a 
"judgment debtor" was made following a hearing on the issue and was 
approved by Russell's counsel and certified as "final" pursuant to 
Rule 54(b). (Rec. p. 248, 249). See also State v. O'Neil. 848 P2d 
694, 697 (Utah App. 1993) and Plumb v. State, 809 P2d 734, 740 (Utah 
1990) . For the same reasons that the Court previously found that 
Russell was not a "judgment debtor" for purposes of former Rule 
69(e)(3), and in harmony with the "law of the case", Russell should 
be precluded from redeeming the Trust Deed Property as a "judgment 
debtor" under subsection (j) of the same Rule. 
The judgment debtors were Drew and Diana, the obligors on the 
note securing the trust deed. (Rec. pp. 143, 251). As judgment 
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debtors, Drew and Diana retained their right to redeem the Trust Deed 
Property from the Sheriff's Sale. A judgment debtor does not 
necessarily require the ownership of property securing the debt. 
Clawson v. Moesser, 535 P.2d 77, 78 (Utah 1975). It is very 
significant that the Utah Rule grants the right to redeem to the 
"judgment debtor" and its successors, not to the owner of the property 
and its successors. The only transfer of redemption rights (which are 
interests in real property) from Drew and Diana was accomplished 
through the written Assignment of Redemption Rights executed by Drew 
and Diana in favor of Rindlesbach. (Rec. pp. 704-705). 
In his Brief, Russell ignores the 1994 Order of Judge Murphy and 
relies instead upon a case interpreting the Arizona redemption rule. 
In Fortv-Four Hundred East Broadway Co. v. 4400 East Broadway, 660 
P.2d 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982), the Arizona Appellate Court construed 
its statute granting the right of redemption broadly, including 
subsequent purchasers of secured real property as persons entitled to 
redeem. That statute is different from Utah's: 
Property sold subject to redemption, or any part sold 
separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or 
their successors in interest: 
1. The judgment debtor or his successor in interest 
in the whole or any part of the property* 
Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-1282. The Utah Rule does not identify 
the "successor in interest in the whole or any part of the property." 
Had the Utah lawmakers desired subsequent purchasers of the real 
estate to enjoy redemption rights, they would have adopted clear 
language similar to Arizona's. Clearly, the purpose of the Utah Rule 
is to protect a party obligated for secured debt from an inequitable 
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liquidation of the secured asset for less than fair value, thereby 
allowing the judgment debtor to minimize the deficiency judgment 
available in Utah. 
Of additional significance to the Arizona Court in Forty-Four 
Hundred was the distinctions made with a prior Arizona case. In Perry 
v. Safety Savings & Loan Association of Kansas City, 544 P.2d 267 
(Ariz. App. Ct. 1976), the court held that Perry did not become a 
successor in interest under the Arizona statute because he failed to 
obtain a "properly acknowledged deed conveying the right of redemption 
of the judgment debtors as to the mortgaged premises. Forty-Four 
Hundred, 660 p.2d at 869. Similar to Perry, Russell has failed to 
obtain a written instrument which could evidence any legal or 
equitable interest in either the real property or the right to redeem 
same. Even in Arizona, Russell would necessarily fail in his quest 
for judicial approval of his asserted redemption rights. Russell may 
not redeem the Trust Deed Property, because he simply does not belong 
to either class of redemptioners set forth in Rule 69(j)(l). 
II. EVAN'S DEALINGS WITH RUSSELL WERE NOT BINDING UPON DREW AND DIANA 
IN ANY ATTEMPT TO SELL THE CONTRACT PROPERTY. 
Just as a contract to sell an interest in land is unenforceable 
by or against parties who did not sign a written contract, one cannot 
serve as an agent for another party whose signature is required on a 
real estate contract without written authorization from the principal. 
There was no ratification as a matter of law because Utah 
Statute of Frauds requires that any agent executing an 
agreement conveying an interest in land on behalf of his 
principal must be authorized in writing. 
15 
Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74, 78 Utah 1982). See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-5-3. It is undisputed that Evan never received a written 
authorization from either Drew of Diana to negotiate or execute a 
contract with Russell for the sale of their real property. (Rec. pp. 
488, 496) . Thus, pursuant to the Utah statute of frauds, not only was 
there no enforceful contract for the sale of the property to Russell, 
but there was no effective authorization for Evan to act on behalf of 
Drew and Diana in connection with real property. 
Since 1987, Drew and Diana have held themselves out to the public 
as owners of the fee title to the Creek Road Property as evidenced by 
good and valid deeds recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
(Rec. pp. 487, 491, 492, 495). Russell's claimed ignorance of that 
fact must be attributable to himself. Furthermore, it is undisputed 
that Russell made no effort to confirm the identity of the owner(s) 
of the Creek Road Property or the apparent authority of Evan to act 
for said owner(s) . Utah law recognized that it is the duty of a buyer 
to confirm the authority of an agent to act on behalf of a principal. 
The general rule is that one who deals with an agent has 
the responsibility to attain the agent's authority despite 
the agent's representations. 
Bradshaw v. McBride, supra at 78. 
Having failed to comply with the statute of frauds for the sale 
of real property and for the designation of Evan as agent to sell real 
property, Russell now asserts that the conduct of Drew and Diana 
confirmed or ratified Evan's act of selling the Creek Road Property 
and somehow overcomes the statute of frauds obstacle. In his action 
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for specific performance, Russell asks this Court to effectively 
repeal the statute of frauds. 
All of the foregoing principles are well established in Utah. 
In the factually similar case Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P. 2d 74 (Utah 
1982) the plaintiffs and defendants owned contiguous parcels of real 
property. One of the eight sibling owners of the McBride property 
entered into an oral agreement with Bradshaw to sell Bradshaw the 
McBride parcel. Bradshaw in fact paid $5,000.00 of the $33,000.00 
sales price. He thereafter repaired fences, installed a water line, 
and grazed his cattle on the McBride parcel. However, the other seven 
sibling owners refused to sell. The trial court entered a judgment 
of specific performance for Bradshaw, but the Utah State Supreme Court 
reversed, holding the contract void under the statute of frauds. The 
issues discussed in Bradshaw include lack of a contract signed by the 
parties in interest, lack of proper agency by the person who 
negotiated the agreement, lack of proper ratification by the owners, 
and lack of sufficient part performance. These are the same issues 
before this Court in the instant case. 
With regard to agency, the Court said: 
. . . The general rule is that one who deals with an agent 
has the responsibility to ascertain the agent's authority 
despite the agent's representations. . . . [citing Dohrmann 
Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel, Inc. . 99 Utah 188, 103 
P.2d 650 (1940) Id. at 78. 
Furthermore, the Court clearly and unequivocally stated the Utah 
law concerning notification as follows: 
Furthermore as to all defendants, there was no ratification 
as a matter of law because the Utah Statute of Frauds 
requires that any agent executing an agreement conveying an 
interest in land on behalf of his principal must be 
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authorized in writing. Utah Code Ann. 1953 § 25-5-3 . . . 
Where the law requires the authority to be given in 
writing, the ratification must also generally be in 
writing, [citations omitted]. Id. 
A similar result occurred in Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 
(Utah 1986). Plaintiffs in that case were joint owners of a home. 
Defendants offered to buy the home and paid earnest money. There was 
no question about the plaintiff wife's intent. She claimed that she 
explicitly authorized her husband to accept on her behalf and fully 
intended to be bound to the contract. The Court held her intent and 
verbal authorization ineffective absent a written acceptance or a 
written authorization given to the husband to act on her behalf. The 
court declared: 
One joint tenant or tenant in common cannot bind his 
cotenant by a contract which he may make relating to the 
common property. . . . [citing Coombs v. Ouzounian, 465 
P.2d 356 (1970)]. 
Thus, even when a party's intent is clear, the lack of written 
authorization renders an oral contract for the sale of real property 
unenforceable. In the instant case, there is no evidence that Diana 
even knew that Russell had negotiated a contract of sale with Evan 
until the sale of the Property to Rindlesbach. There are no factual 
assertions of Drew's knowledge until two years after the alleged oral 
argument was made. Under the Utah standard, Evan cannot be deemed an 
agent for the fee title owners of the Creek Road Property as a matter 
of law, and the oral contract is unenforceable. 
Even if Drew and Diana had known all the details about what Evan 
was allegedly doing with respect to the sale of the property, their 
acquiescence could not serve as a substitute for a properly written 
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agency or as an estoppel to deny agency. See, Coombs v. Ouzounian, 
24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970). Coombs involved an action for 
specific performance of an option to purchase the defendants' home. 
The defendant husband had signed the option contract but his wife and 
joint owner of the property had not. The plaintiff argued that the 
defendant wife was equitably estopped to deny her husband's agency to 
sign on her behalf because she knew he had signed the agreement but 
did nothing to indicate her lack of consent. Her lack of action 
arguably implied her assent to his acting as her agent. The Court 
held the contract void under the statute of frauds. Its holding on 
the estoppel argument was as follows: 
. any contract by a husband affecting the wife's 
interest in land is unenforceable against her in the 
absence of a written authorization signed by the wife, 
since there is no husband-wife exception to the statute of 
frauds. The court observed that the wife admitted in her 
deposition that she knew her husband was selling the 
property to plaintiff and that she intended him to do so. 
However, since the wife was not bound by her husband's 
action, whatever effect her acquiescence might have been 
was ended when she granted her interest in the property to 
a third person. Id. at 465. P.2d 358. 
In the instant case, Drew and Diana have stated that never 
authorized Evan to act on their behalf and they do not consider the 
alleged oral agreement between Evan and Russell valid or enforceable. 
III. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS PREVENTS RUSSELL FROM ASSERTING ANY 
OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE CONTRACT PROPERTY. 
The Utah Statute of Frauds provides that: 
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall be 
created granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1995 Repl.). An express reading of this 
statute, by itself, precludes Russell from asserting any ownership 
interest in any part of the Creek Road Property. Russell admits the 
absolute absence of any written documents signed by any of the parties 
conveying or agreeing to convey the Creek Road Property. (See 
Appellant's Brief at p. 7, 5 7; Rec. p. 732). 
However, the Utah Code Annotated §25-5-8 (1995 Repl.) provides 
further that "[n]othing in this chapter contained shall be construed 
to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of 
agreements in case of part performance thereof." Thus, the relevant 
issue becomes whether certain actions of Russell, as a matter of law, 
constitute part performance sufficient to recognize the alleged oral 
contract notwithstanding the statute of frauds. Utah courts have 
determined what constitutes sufficient part performance generally. 
In Martin v. Scholl. 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983), the Court restated the 
rule announced in Randall v. Tracy Collins & Trust Co., 305 P.2d 480 
(Utah 1956), as follows: 
First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear and 
definite; second, the acts done in performance of the 
contract must be equally clear and definite; and third, the 
acts must be in reliance on the contract. Such acts in 
reliance must be such that (a) they would not have been 
performed had the contract not existed and (b) the failure 
to perform on the part of the promisor would result in 
fraud on the performer who relied, since damages would be 
inadequate. 
The element of reliance is of particular importance, especially 
when the existence of the oral contract is contested or the oral 
contract's terms, as in the present case, lack definiteness. Id. at 
276. In such cases, the acts of reliance must be "exclusively 
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referable" to the contract. If the acts "can be explained on another 
ground, they are insufficient to remove the bar of the statute of 
frauds and the contract is unenforceable." Id. at 277. 
In Martinf the trial court found the plaintiff to have entered 
into an oral contract with a Mr. Chaff in in 1947, making the following 
findings: 
Pursuant to the contract, Mr. Chaffin agreed to convey to 
plaintiff 120 acres of land if Martin would continue 
working as his foreman. Martin remained, receiving a 
salary and occasional raises. . .. From the time Chaffin 
and Martin entered into their agreement . . . until 
Chaffin's death on July 30, 1975, Martin worked exclusively 
for Chaffin as his foreman in reliance upon their agreement 
that the subject property would be conveyed to Martin. In 
reliance on the agreement, Martin labored 10 to 16 hours 
per day, 7 days a week during the summer months and, 
occasionally when necessary, worked around the clock. In 
the winter time, Martin labored 8 to 10 hours per day, 7 
days a week. During this period of time Martin's salary 
ranged from $75 per month in 1947, to $375 per month in 
1975. From 1960 until 1969, Martin received $325 per month 
without a single raise. Additionally . . . Martin and his 
wife Martha, provided substantial personal services to 
Chaffin and that Martin's son Denny performed farming 
operations on Chaffin's farms and ranches for which he was 
not compensated. It is further found that these services 
would not have been provided but for the agreement between 
Chaff in and Martin that the subject property was to be 
conveyed to Martin. 
The Utah Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court's decision 
and held that these acts of alleged reliance by the proposed purchaser 
— labor 10 to 16 hours per day, seven days a week in the summer and 
8 to 10 hours per day in the winter — constituted insufficient part 
performance to remove the oral contract from the statute of frauds. 
The Court held that the conduct of the plaintiff could have been 
reasonably explained on grounds other than the recognition on an oral 
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agreement and were therefore not "exclusively referable" to the 
contract. Id. at 279. 
Similarly, in Price v. Lloyd, 86 P. 767 (Utah 1906), the Court 
reversed a lower court's judgment awarding real property to a 
decedent's niece who had moved onto decedent's property, made 
improvements thereon and performed personal services for the deceased. 
In both Price and Martin, the Court overruled the lower courts' 
findings and found that the plaintiffs failed to show their respective 
actions could be reasonably explained only by the recognition and 
enforcement of a disputed oral contract. 
The alleged oral contract between Evan and Russell lacks definite 
terms. (Rec. pp. 478-480). The proposed written document was never 
executed; neither was it followed. If any oral agreement between 
Russell and Evan is to be enforced, Russell must show that his 
sporadic payments were actions of reliance and exclusively referable 
to the alleged contract. By his admission, his actions do not rise 
to that level. His own testimony indicates other reasons for his 
periodic payments to Evan. (Rec. pp. 460-462). Russell was a tenant 
on the Property. Evan's attorney, Merrill G. Hansen, informed Russell 
of the problems due to the failure to finalize any sale of the 
Contract Property and characterized the relationship as landlord-
tenant with animal boarding services. (Rec. pp. 105-107). Evan kept 
and cared for Russell's horses throughout the period when Russell was 
allegedly purchasing the Property. Russell also gave Evan loans at 
various times, even preceding the alleged purchase of the Creek Road 
Property, without any definite terms of repayment. 
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The fact that Evan's family and Drew's family continued to live 
in the two homes on the Creek Road Property and that Russell failed 
to occupy either home or obtain rent payments for the same further 
evidences that Russell did not believe that he owned the Creek Road 
Property. Most importantly, Russell even failed to communicate his 
intentions to purchase the Property to the actual owners, Drew and 
Diana, until they told Russell of their intent to sell to Rindlesbach. 
The alternative explanations for Russell's actions provide the more 
than adequate basis to dismiss Russell's attempt to enforce a disputed 
oral contract to purchase real property. 
In his Brief, Russell places heavy reliance on the recent case, 
The Georae Fisher, Jr. Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust v. Fisher, 
277 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Ut. App. 1995). In Fisher this Court 
recognized an oral modification of a written agreement for the sale 
of real property through partial performance. The subject of the 
modification was the timing of payments, and there was support for 
some form of modification from both parties. The issue was limited 
to the specific terms being modified. 
The instant case is a far different one from Fisher. Here, the 
very purpose and existence of the alleged oral agreement is contested. 
There is no written agreement between Russell and Drew and Diana which 
can be subject to interpretation or oral modification based on the 
conduct of the parties. Unlike Fisher, this case is an example of 
exactly the kind of contested conveyance of real property that the 
statute of frauds was enacted to prevent. 
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CONCLUSION 
There are many contested facts in this matter, but none of them 
were necessary for the determination of the District Court. Because 
there are no genuine issues as to any material fact, and because 
Rindlesbach was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the 
District Court properly found (1) that Russell was neither a "judgment 
debtor" or a "successor to the judgment debtor, and therefore lacked 
the statutory capacity to redeem the Trust Deed Property from the 
Sheriffs Sale, (2) that the acts allegedly performed by Russell in 
reliance on his asserted oral contract with Evan for the purchase of 
real property failed to meet the test of exclusive reference, and (3) 
that therefore the statute of frauds prevented the enforcement of 
Russell's asserted oral contract. Rindlesbach respectfully urges this 
Court to affirm the District Court's Order on Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Russell and its Judgment and Decree Quieting 
Title. 
DATED this 0 day of October, 1996. 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
T. Richard Davis 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellee, Mark L. Rindlesbach 
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